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C.S. LEWIS AND CHRISTIAN POSTMODERNISM: WORD, IMAGE, AND 
BEYOND. Kyoko Yuasa. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016. xii+198 pp. 
9781498219389. Hbk. $41.00, pbk. $26.00, Kindle $9.99. 
 
N C. S. LEWIS AND CHRISTIAN POSTMODERNISM, KYOKO YUASA has managed to 
advance the cause of careful reading and discussion of Lewis’s novels as 
contemporary cultural artifacts, rather than mere ciphers for apologetics or mere 
fluff for children, for both Japanese and American audiences. This is no mean 
feat, not only in terms of translation but also in terms of trans-Pacific discourse, 
and Yuasa deserves great credit for the accomplishment. Her close reading of 
several of Lewis’s major fiction works in a comparative frame she derives from 
works by Iris Murdoch, Muriel Spark, Doris Lessing, and John Fowles yields 
insights into the experimental character of much of Lewis’s fiction. Yuasa 
convincingly suggests that Lewis not only creatively employed a wide variety 
of very modern forms to resist both literary and theological Modernism but also 
wrestled with and strove to include in his fiction the voices of the powerful 
women who are so present in his biography and so conspicuously absent from 
many discussions of his apologetics. If her claim that the texts Lewis left us 
evince a “Christian postmodernism” of which he is a major philosopher 
ultimately falls flat, it does so in the grand tradition of English letters, leaving 
behind like so many arched windows and paving-stones a set of claims that 
future readers of Lewis will want to contemplate. 
 Yuasa claims “Christian postmodernism” as her own coinage for this 
discussion of Lewis, and describes it as “a seemingly unconventional rhetoric 
that Lewis must have employed to reach the mindset of the postmodern world” 
(2). Although tangled in expression, this description plays well with what most 
readers will know of Lewis’s background, aims, and methods in apologetics—
including his very modern insistence that his fiction was neither didactic nor 
allegorical, but imaginative. A standard postmodernist account of modernity 
argues that the postmodern condition inexorably unfolds from the conditions 
and structures of modernity, so that the most successful works of artistic 
Modernism are interpreted as overflowing or overloading the boundaries of 
Modernism itself. It does make sense, then, to argue that Lewis, as a thoroughly 
modern writer uncomfortable with Modernism, employed his familiarity with 
the history of literature and philosophy to negotiate a better settlement. Lewis 
can then be cast as a “postmodern novelist” and, given his explicit faith and its 
inclusion in his works, as a “Christian postmodern novelist.” 
 When Yuasa stays close to this more modest understanding of 
“postmodern” as a negotiation of a better settlement with modernity, her 
approach has some merit. Yuasa is at her best when closely reading specific 
stories from Lewis, which she keenly appreciates both in themselves and in their 
I 
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historical and theoretical contexts. In discussing Till We Have Faces, for example, 
Yuasa emphasizes Lewis’s “retelling of stories,” arguing that he “extracts the 
essence of myths through the process of retelling” (142). She is aware of the 
balancing act by which Lewis, both influenced by and reacting against 
Bultmannian Biblical criticism, sought to assert the historical factuality of “true 
myth” while also arguing, in Neo-orthodox fashion, that not the verifiability of 
its history but its ineffably mythic character was the source of its significance. 
Thus, although he claims to avoid allegorism, in Yuasa’s words Lewis “uses the 
novel as a tool of truth in the same way as mythology” (143). Shakespeare would 
be surprised to learn from Yuasa that “story within a story” is a “postmodernist” 
approach, but it is true that such disrupted and diverted narrative flows are 
characteristic of much modern and postmodern writing. In extreme cases such 
as Till We Have Faces, which is not only a multilayered epistolary narrative but 
has a false ending and a complicated relationship between the narrator and the 
implied audience, such choices beg further explanation. 
 Yuasa senses that Lewis’s strictures against allegorical readings of his 
works cannot easily be applied to Till We Have Faces, and offers methodical 
descriptions of the manifestly emblematic characters of the novel—
representatives of the pagan cosmos of the received Psyche and Cupid story, 
among others. She peels apart the layers, guiding the reader through the original 
story, Lewis’s adaptation of it, and the rhetorical moves his character Orual 
makes in retelling it within the story. Yuasa’s sensitivity to the way “Orual 
changes herself from [...] an ugly woman, Ungit, to a harmony of both Orual and 
Psyche” is valuable, and provides an opening for further reflection on the ways 
the experiences and writings of women are reflected and refracted in Lewis’s 
writings (146). If phrases such as “the monopoly of multiple roles to the 
abandonment of self” are opaque (146), patient readers will often find more 
helpful explanations later, such as that “Orual monopolizes all perspectives” 
through her extremely privileged initial position and her self-conscious reversal 
of status (149). Indeed, Yuasa’s exploration of what seems to be a surprisingly 
complex presentation of women’s writing as a model of negotiating spiritual 
reality and identity is so interesting that I could seriously wish for a chapter or 
more carefully teasing out the extent of Joy Davidman’s influence on Till We 
Have Faces that Yuasa tantalizingly mentions in one concluding paragraph (161), 
after having suggested the line of inquiry in her introduction (8-9) and framed 
up the analysis at length in one section of a previous chapter (57-65). 
 In Chapter Three, on That Hideous Strength, and Chapter Four, on 
Voyage of the “Dawn Treader,” Yuasa provides readings similar to her discussion 
of Till We Have Faces in Chapter Five. These readings alone offer plenty of value, 
although even here Yuasa would have been better served by tougher editors. In 
a middle-voice book based on a doctoral dissertation such as this, the readings 
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really should be a great deal more polished and detailed. It is hard to resist the 
suggestion that this might have been possible had Yuasa abandoned the attempt 
to invent a “Christian postmodernism” such that Lewis can be called, as the title 
of Chapter One has it, “Philosopher of Christian Postmodernism.” The critical 
and comparative readings in these chapters alone are quite sufficient to support 
the more modest and accurate claim that Lewis can meaningfully be read as a 
“postmodern novelist” on the basis of similarities between his rhetorical 
strategies and those of other novelists called “postmodern,” and a “Christian 
postmodern novelist” on the basis of his deployment of those strategies to secure 
an opening toward Christian truth that maintains the tension of historical verity 
and personal troth. Much of the work of Chapter Two, including the tantalizing 
work on the presence of women’s writing in Lewis’s works, would gain 
definition and solidity by serving an analysis of Lewis’s writings rather than an 
idiosyncratic theory about the anachronistic philosophical project he definitely 
never named, and with which he is unlikely to have felt much sympathy. 
 Nevertheless, the project of defining “Lewis’s concept of Christian 
postmodernism” has been attempted, and must be evaluated (2). Yuasa enforces 
this upon her readers. It is tempting to take at face value the significant retreat 
from her major claim expressed in sentences such as “[Lewis] is an anti-
modernist philosopher who welcomes postmodern sensibility” (4); there is no 
very great difficulty in allowing that a modern writer strategically employing 
an array of modern rhetorical strategies in order to find a way past Modernism 
is “postmodern” in some meaningful sense. Such a postmodern artistic 
sensibility is entirely compatible with an “anti-modernist” philosophical 
agenda; noticing it is no stranger than pointing out the affinity between the 
works of Hieronymus Bosch and those of Salvador Dali. On the very next page, 
however, Yuasa rejects the nuance, averring that “many Lewis scholars [...] 
conclude that he is neither modernist nor postmodernist. The reason for their 
antipathy is a fear of both thoughts” (5). Indeed, she repeats this delegitimizing 
attribution of motive early in Chapter One (14), and it serves as the subtle thread 
dividing the “negative” response from “positive voices” who “do not deny the 
complicated nature of Lewis’s writings” (6). Setting aside any such fear, then, 
and also the fear of giving offence to such a gifted reader of Lewis’s fiction, let 
us evaluate Yuasa’s core claim. 
 Permitted no distinction between “anti-modernist philosopher” and 
“postmodern novelist,” there is simply no way to support the thesis that Lewis 
is “postmodernist” in any sense Lewis himself might have recognized as part of 
his philosophical agenda. Yuasa provides all the evidence needed to reject this 
claim in her own arguments and circumlocutions. She is unfortunately not 
sufficiently well-versed in modern philosophy, nor sufficiently well-advised by 
her “positive voices,” to adjust her claim accordingly. Yuasa begins by 
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informing her readers that “the term ‘postmodernism’ was first used in the 1930s 
and culturally expanded in the 1960s” (14). (Let the reader look in Volume XII, 
Issue 4 of The Hibbert Journal, published in 1914, for an essay titled “Post-
Modernism,” which is not strictly the first usage, but among the first relevant 
ones for a discussion of “Christian postmodernism.”) Having adverted to this 
history, Yuasa’s discussion of “postmodernism” turns instead on a contest 
between various writers from the 1990s and later. She describes a “negative” 
view based on Lyotard’s crucial 1979 essay La Condition postmoderne and a 
“positive” view that apparently isolates Lyotard’s use of Wittgenstein from his 
larger project. She does not, however, offer any understanding of Lyotard’s 
discussion of “meta-narratives” and “micro-narratives” except the one she 
attributes to those who “negatively interpret the notion of the ‘postmodern’ as 
the dethroning of God,” namely, that incredulity toward metanarratives is 
“rejection of the traditional values in Europe” (14-15). Of course, Lyotard’s 
concern in 1979, 16 years after Lewis’s death, is the enclosure of all human 
knowing within computer networks, with the concomitant reduction of human 
discourse to a means of optimizing the programming of each human subject in 
the interests of a society conceived as a network of functions and datasets. The 
metanarratives he discusses are the animating principles of social-science 
theories, principally the idea that society necessarily comprises two parts in 
conflict (Marxism), which he regards as “traditional theory” (and which has no 
obvious relationship to, say, the moral universe of European Christendom). 
Yuasa bases her claims on sources who plainly do not understand recent 
philosophy, and unfortunately has not done sufficient primary research to 
correct them. 
 As a result of this misplaced trust in sources and her own lack of 
understanding of the major sources of postmodern thought, Yuasa leaves her 
reader to search for sense in phrases such as “traditional values in Europe [...] 
that include dualism, either by science or by absolute belief” or “re-evaluate, 
from a Christian perspective, the significance of individual varieties based on 
the postmodern philosopher’s phrases that respect multiple opinions” (15). 
Presumably this “dualism” is a misunderstanding of Lyotard’s characterization 
of traditional (Marxist) theory as regarding social change as the product of class 
conflict. Turning the page, one must hope it is simply unhappy phrasing that 
has James K.A. Smith affirming “interpretive pluralism within the church” such 
that “one (single) world is composed of multiple (plural) factors, as may be seen 
in the Trinity” (16). Surely the reader is not meant to conclude that the Trinity is 
an example of wordplay, or a composite being? Presumably this sentence results 
from confusing the idea that human reception of truth is perspectival (so that 
there will always be a plurality of specific affirmations, each of which may be 
true in their respective senses) with the understanding that language signs are 
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frequently plurivocal, especially when applied to God (whom creatures 
necessarily apprehend analogously). 
 As an evangelical scholar interested in postmodern thought, Yuasa 
would profit by a closer examination of Smith’s work, and that of Stanley J. 
Grenz, along with a more careful reading of the primary sources of postmodern 
philosophy in general. Instead, Yuasa superficially attends to these and then 
depends heavily on far weaker interlocutors, like Crystal Downing (who glosses 
Derrida phrases without having understood his project), from whom she learns 
that “some fear postmodernism on the assumption that taking all truths equally 
leads to relativism” (18). Of course, literally attempting to situate all human 
truth-claims within some rarefied conception of “truth” or set of claims about 
inculturation of meaning such that all such claims can be considered “true” not 
only “leads to relativism,” but is relativism itself. Postmodern thinkers differ 
about whether relativism is good or bad, and also about whether it is or is not a 
necessary result of the historical processes by which modernity came to be. 
Nearly all philosophers of any stripe, however, could agree that the assertion “it 
is not God but human language which is situated” (18) is mere hand-waving in 
the face of the de facto pluralism of modernity and the question of relativism that 
arises from it. Similarly, Yuasa’s choice of Louis Markos as her major foil among 
Christian Lewis scholars is unfortunate (19); his argument that Lewis is a 
staunch anti-modernist (and ipso facto an inveterate enemy of postmodernism) 
actually aligns better with her extensive discussion of Lewis’s anti-modern 
rhetorical strategies than her own arguments do. His depiction of Saussure and 
Derrida is facile, but his argument nonetheless cleaves closer to the actual 
sources of postmodern thought than Yuasa ever gets. 
 Yuasa simply has not grasped the major principles of any of those 
thinkers whom disciples and detractors alike recognize as “postmodern 
philosophers,” or what it is that causes them to speak of “postmodernity” or a 
“postmodern condition.” As a result, she gleans from Downing, especially, 
some very strange notions about Lewis’s project. Yuasa relates as Downing’s the 
claim that “Lewis deconstructs past models the same way that Thomas S. Kuhn 
argues in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)” (20). This suggestion 
would probably startle both Lewis and Kuhn, not least because 
“deconstruction” would not enter the vocabulary until several years after Kuhn 
published on “paradigm shifts” and Lewis died. Furthermore, while there is an 
affinity between Kuhn’s work and Lewis’s, this affinity falls just where they are 
both modern: in that they consider major gestalts in human understanding as 
essentially similar to the developmental process of an individual. This means 
they take as given that there is a continuity of subject (the individual or the 
society) and a direction of change (toward a more comprehensive integration of 
experience and explanation). What is quite implausible is that Lewis would 
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agree that “deconstructs” as Derrida coins the term, or even Heidegger’s 
Destruktion, is what Lewis does with regard to philosophy, to theology, or to 
“past models.” It is especially the case that Lewis’s The Discarded Image, in 
affectionately detailing the Ptolemaic cosmos while admitting that its 
elaboration from a phenomenal description of the visible universe required 
correction as more accurate science became available, is not accurately described 
in the words “He exposes the modernist’s construction of another model, which 
he indicates in The Discarded Image: ‘No model is a catalogue of ultimate 
realities’” (20). 
 So while “rehabilitates the values discarded by modernist thought” is 
a good description of some of Lewis’s work (1), Yuasa does not help us to clearly 
grasp what these are and whether such rehabilitation is characteristic of 
postmodern philosophy. Without a clear sense of whether “modernist” means 
a typically modern person such as Lewis, a theological Modernist such as Loisy 
or Bultmann, or a poetic Modernist such as Eliot or Auden, we cannot begin to 
judge the truth of “The term ‘postmodernism’ is generally used to mean the anti-
modernist movement in and after the 1960s that advocates a multiplicity of 
philosophical and cultural notions” (2). Without understanding that, we cannot 
make sense of whether “Lewis deconstructs the modernist’s single 
interpretation of the truth.” Surely it cannot mean something as adolescent as 
“He deconstructs the interpretation commonly accepted by the previous 
generation,” for such a deconstruction would fail before it began; such a narrow 
tactical objective would simply evacuate the meaning of the term 
“deconstruction.” Nor is it possible to defend the assertion that “Lewis 
deconstructs the previous interpretations of the text influenced by the cultures 
of the time” (3), whatever “text” may be indicated, on the basis of 
acknowledgments of changing science in Lewis’s paean to the Ptolemaic cosmos 
in The Discarded Image. 
 Indeed, the reader is left to wonder whether Yuasa finds that the belief 
that all learning is inculturated is an objectionable Modernist belief, so that 
readers must be freed from “text influenced by the cultures of the time” (3), or 
whether it is a desirable postmodernist belief, so that Lewis is to be praised for 
being “a promoter of peripheral cultures” (4). Of course, the idea that learning 
is deeply inculturated is part of the postmodern inheritance from modernity, 
because the postmodern condition is precisely what follows when the social and 
technical conditions of modernity do not answer satisfactorily to prevailing 
modern descriptions of them; postmodern thought typically argues that 
modernity is constantly producing its own excess, overflowing itself, without 
having exhausted the impulses which led to those conditions and those 
descriptions. (Prominent among these impulses, of course, is the turn away from 
the sources of cultural authority inherited from European Christendom, a turn 
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dramatized by references to the “death of God” or “the default of God.”) While 
modernity’s excesses may be traces of any number of possible understandings 
excluded or simplified out in reductive modern conceptual schemes, including 
the claims and values of “peripheral cultures,” postmodern philosophy insofar 
as it is named by the disciples and detractors of its major thinkers does not find 
this significance by an “anti-modernist” gesture that invites “collaboration with 
the author to reach an understanding beyond human interpretation” (3). In fact, 
the welcome given to “micro-narratives” is precisely conditioned on the 
rejection of any such transcendent understanding. 
 Insofar as Yuasa is right to highlight Crystal Downing’s rejection of one 
facile reading of Derrida’s oft-mistranslated «il n’y a pas dehors-texte», then, she 
is sorely mistaken to follow Downing to the conclusion that “Derrida resisted 
the modernist values along with other post-structural thinkers” (4). What 
Derrida did, in collaboration and rivalry with a number who rose to prominence 
downstream of Heidegger in the 1960s, was to push the work he inherited from 
Heidegger farther than Heidegger did—to be more thorough in delimiting the 
enclosure of any possible encounter with Being precisely by ever more 
rigorously enforcing the principle that everything understood among beings is 
already found in the language of beings—that “there is no ‘beyond the text.’” 
Carefully attended to, Derrida is much more interesting than the snarling 
destroyer Markos fables forth; but Derrida is definitely not trying to help Lewis 
guide anyone to “an understanding that transcends human language” (18). Nor, 
we may be confident, would Lewis, the recovering atheistic Idealist with 
Boethian and Neo-orthodox affinities, be a likely choice to cooperate with 
Derrida in this project. 
 The confusion nears its peak when Yuasa, again following Downing, 
reads the incident of the Tower of Babel as describing “the modernist Christian 
world” that “sets up one discourse as an absolute truth for reaching Heaven, so 
that they get confused with multiple interpretations in the postmodern world” 
(13). The puzzling sentence raises the question of how any “discourse” might 
serve “for reaching heaven,” even if one should find a method for evaluating 
any “discourse” as “an absolute truth.” Any question of identifying this 
“modernist Christian world” with the theological Modernism that Lewis 
opposed is, of course, out the window at this point. The absolute apex of the 
confusion, however, must be the claim that 
 
Through reading classical literature, including the Bible, Lewis is 
possibly inspired by such postmodern approaches as: the Apostle Paul’s 
method of speaking within the discourse of the reader, the dialogic 
potential of language, the joy of reading in any genre, and the reader’s 
participation (7). 
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If St. Paul’s rhetoric is postmodern, we may well ask, what is not? The rest is 
silence. 
 Throughout this book, Yuasa demonstrates that she is a careful and 
deeply sympathetic reader of Lewis, and insightful when she is reading closely. 
Her care for the much-loved novelist, apologist, and Oxford don is worthy of 
praise, and her skill in the service of those works and their characters is 
exemplary. I would dearly love to read the book she writes about Joy 
Davidman’s presence in the text of Till We Have Faces, or more straightforward 
comparative work. As for C.S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism, any Lewis 
scholar who is interested in the author’s ongoing popular and critical reception 
should add it to the shelf, especially those who identify as evangelicals and 
make room for their faith in their scholarship. I would not assign it to a class, as 
its conceptual world is confused and the very poor editing makes the book much 
easier to nit-pick than I have here represented. It is of no use in serious 
discussions of “postmodernism,” except as an example of an idiosyncratic usage 
of the term derived from weak philosophical sources; readers not warned about 
this are likely to give up on the book before the end of the Introduction. Those 
who persist, perhaps encouraged by the very tactfully worded blurbs on the 
back, will likely be rewarded with several insights into Lewis’s novels that are 
worth the price of admission. 
—Peter G. Epps 
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EADERS FAMILIAR WITH THE INKLINGS GENERALLY have some knowledge about 
Owen Barfield and his works, which might prompt interest in Michael 
Vincent Di Fuccia’s Owen Barfield: Philosophy, Poetry, and Theology. Although it is 
not essential for a reader to have prior knowledge about Barfield, it could be 
helpful since Di Fuccia’s book is not as much an introduction to Barfield as it is 
scholarly insight on Barfield’s theories about philosophy, poetry, and theology. 
These subjects can be deep and sometimes difficult to understand, but Di Fuccia 
does an admirable job of providing background in each chapter before delving 
into weightier analysis. His introduction includes a brief literature review and 
outlines the plan of the book with some defined terminology.   
 With any study of Barfield, it is a given that Rudolf Steiner, 
anthroposophy, and the “evolution of consciousness” must be discussed as key 
R 
